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Releasing Democracy:  
Giving Real Power to the People 






The start of the new millennium coincided with a flurry of celebrations to mark the 
birth of democracy in Australia—the establishment of parliamentary rule by elected 
representatives of the people. The national celebrations to mark the centennial of 
federation and the first sitting of the national parliament in 2001 were quickly 
followed by festivities to mark sesquicentennials of the states which attained self-
government in the mid-1850s. When South Australia celebrated its sesquicentennial 
this year its constitution was hailed by a leading academic commentator as ‘perhaps 
the most democratic constitution and election system in Australia, possibility the 
world.’1  
 
In the popular imagination, however, the celebration which resonated most deeply 
with the birth of democracy in this country fell between the national and state 
celebrations which were relatively staid affairs presided over by official dignitaries 
and their invited guests. I refer, of course, to the sesquicentennial in 2004 of the 
uprising of the miners on the Ballarat goldfields—the Eureka Stockade. 
 
The Stockade has long had a place in Australian popular mythology as the birthplace 
of Australian democracy. The extent to which the Eureka uprising, in fact, did hasten 
the transfer of power from the ruling elite to the people is still the subject of dispute in 
the academic literature, but it is not one of the purposes of this paper to intervene in 
this debate.2 There is little dispute that Eureka stands as a popular symbol for 
‘releasing the spirit of democracy in Australia’. As Sunter and others have pointed out 
Eureka has become a symbol of protean proportions and diverse groups have found 
some nourishment in the ‘stockade everlasting’—nationalists, trade unionists, civil 
libertarians and most recently advocates for Australia becoming a republic at the start 
of the new millennium.3  
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If Eureka did release the spirit of democracy in Australia, however, there is a paradox 
between the promise represented by that uprising 150 years ago and the political 
realities of 21st century Australia. The question addressed in this article is this: 150 
years after the ‘Ballarat Charter' proclaimed the ‘inalienable right of every citizen to 
have a voice in making the laws he is called upon to obey’ and all the rights and 
freedoms claimed by the rebels have been met, why do surveys show that the majority 
of Australians still think they have little, if any, influence over the government that 
rules them? Nor do they feel politicians care much what they think. The paradox is 
compounded by evidence that the desire for people to have a greater say in 
government has never been stronger. 
 
The answer to the paradox lies, in part at least, in the contested meaning of 
democracy, and in an astute observation by an eminent British scholar of democracy, 
John Dunn, who has argued that as much as the modern state might claim to ground 
its rule ultimately in the will of the people, its central motif is a firm appropriation of 
the capacity for subsequent political agency from the people. In Dunn’s view: ‘In no 
modern state do the people in fact rule, and… there is little reason to see in the history 
of any modern state over any period of time a reasonably straightforward intention to 
permit them to do anything of the kind.’4 
 
In this article, therefore, will begin by briefly examining what the Eureka insurgents 
wanted, to what extent their demands have been fulfilled, and whether this 
achievement has produced a political system in which every citizen thinks that ‘he’ 
has attained the ‘inalienable right to have a [real] voice in making the laws he is called 
upon to obey’.5 
 
The Ballarat Charter and Beyond 
If Australia is ‘The Disillusioned Democracy’6 then it certainly is not the result of the 
unmet claims of the Eureka dissidents. All the reforms called for in the charter have 
long been in place, and more besides. The political reforms outlined by the Reform 
League included full and fair representation; male suffrage; no property qualification 
of Members for the Legislative Council; payment of MPs; and short duration of 
Parliament.7 Today’s ‘disillusioned democrat’ not only has all these democratic boons 
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but also a lower as well as an upper house of Parliament to which all citizens in good 
standing are eligible for election; and full female suffrage. In addition, the right to 
vote has been extended to 18-year olds. This raises the question of whether the 
intentions the framers of the Ballarat Charter and what in fact has been achieved since 
are the same thing. 
 
The simplest definition of democracy is rule by the people, but evidence that the 
people do not think they have much say over their own governance is strong. Since 
the mid-1980s Australians have been surveyed after each federal election about their 
political attitudes as part of the Australian Election Study (AES) and at more irregular 
intervals in National Social Science Survey (NSSS).  
 
Recent surveys of Australians’ attitudes about their political efficacy paint the 
following picture. In the 2001 AES, less than one in four Australians replied 
positively to the proposition that ‘political parties in Australia care what people 
think’—a similar proportion as gave a positive response to the same question in the 
1998 AES.8 More than two thirds had not much or no confidence in political parties 
and about half expressed similar sentiments about the Federal Parliament.9 In the 
NSSS held in the mid-1990s more than half the respondents agreed that ‘people like 
me have no influence on government’; about one in five only gave a positive response 
to the proposition that ‘the average person has considerable influence on politics’; 
while less than a third thought that ‘the people we elect as MPs try to keep the 
promises they have made during an election.’10  Only about one in six Australians 
think that government is mostly run for the benefit of all rather than by a few big 
interests.11 Surveys also show that many Australians think the government is not 
listening to them and that they do not trust their elected representatives.  Only about 
one in six Australians give politicians a high rating for ethics and honesty.12 
 
Disillusioned Democrats 
The survey data outlined above tells us that 150 years after the ‘release of the spirit of 
democracy’ at Eureka we seem to have a nation of disillusioned democrats, many of 
whom appear to feel they have little more influence on they way they are governed 
than the unfranchised miners at Ballarat. This is despite the fact that modern-day 
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Australia is, in many ways, more democratic than the ancient Greek nation-state of 
Athens which is often held up as the democratic ideal. In the Athenian democracy 
citizenship was restricted to Athenian-born adult males; women could not vote, nor 
could metics (the ancient Greek equivalent of the ‘guest workers’ of modern states) or 
slaves. Of those eligible to speak and vote in the Athenian Assembly, a minority only 
were able to attend or choose to do so. Citizens who lived outside Athens were 
effectively disenfranchised from participating because they lived too far from the 
assembly to participate.13 
 
In one important respect, however, Athenian democracy differed markedly from the 
dominant form of government which is characterised as democracy in modern 
advanced industrial societies such as Australia in that it was largely direct. Citizens 
were not represented but cast their votes on their own behalf. Laws were made and 
government decisions taken by assemblies which every citizen had the right to attend, 
have his say and record a vote. This is not to say that an educated elite did not have 
influence well beyond that justified by their numbers alone. Their influence, however, 
was under continual scrutiny by the demos. An American scholar of ancient Greece, 
Josiah Ober, tells us that the elite orators who tended to dominate the proceedings of 
the Assembly were required to maintain to the ‘dramatic fiction’ that they too were 
common men and to express their solidarity with egalitarian ideals: 
This drama served as a mechanism of social control over the political 
ambitions of the elite… Thus the Athenians reaped the benefit of having 
educated men serve in advisory roles of state. At the same time the 
Athenians kept their well-educated advisers on a tight leash and restrained 
the tendency of the educated elite to evolve into a ruling oligarchy.14 
 
In modern democracies, however, the people’s right to participate in government is 
largely restricted to the right to vote for representatives who, in theory, will represent 
their interests when laws are made and policy decisions taken. Though representative 
democracy has become virtually synonymous with democracy for nation-states since 
the 20th century, it has a ‘dark side’ as Dunn hints at above, and as the equally 
eminent commentator Robert Dahl spells out in his book On Democracy. 
Representative democracy’s ‘dark side’, in Dahl’s view, is a consequence of citizens 
delegating enormous discretionary authority over decisions of extraordinary 
importance not only to elected representatives, but to bureaucrats, judges, and in 
recent years, supra-national organisations. ‘Attached to the institutions of polyarchal 
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democracy that help citizens to exercise influence over the conduct and decisions of 
their government is a nondemocratic process, bargaining among political and 
bureaucratic elites.’15 
 
The power of the modern citizen to call the ruling elites to account at elections every 
few years for their management of the affairs of the state, is obviously a weak 
substitute for the power the Athenian demos reserved to themselves to have the final 
say over all important decisions affecting the government of the polity of which they 
were citizens. 
 
Ober has argued that in the Athenian state the demos harboured an innate distrust of 
the elite which existed side by side with recognition of the valuable contribution men 
with elite ability and education could make to the state. This dichotomy resulted in 
two political ideologies co-existing in an uneasy tension. Egalitarian ideology stressed 
the native intelligence of the average Athenian, the wisdom of group decisions and the 
potential evil of elite control. Elite ideology, on the other hand, emphasised the fact 
that some men did possess extraordinary skills useful to the state and deserved a 
privileged position in the political organisation of the state.16  
 
This tension has resurfaced with the reincarnation of democracy in modern times in its 
representative form, but the fault line is much deeper because the balance of power 
has been tilted very much toward the elite. Because of their complexity and size 
modern democracies need a representative system to make democracy workable. This 
is a view which goes almost unquestioned in mainstream political thought. The 
problem lies in claims that such a system reflects true majority rule. French political 
scientists Meny and Surel summarise this dilemma which lies at the heart of 
representative democracy thus: 
The absolute power of the people had to compromise with the need to 
devolve authority to an elite selected through competition within the 
boundaries of a polity…[W]e have to live with this contradiction because 
neither social scientists nor politicians have been able to provide a more 
appealing or workable alternative The present model can be adjusted and 
improved but it remains deeply marked by its original flaw—the 
constitutive tension between its ideology (the power of the people) and its 
functioning (the power of the elites chosen by the people).17 
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The reasons these tensions between the elite and the demos have been intensifying in 
the latter part of the 20th century, and are continuing do to so, are still a matter of 
debate among political scientists and are too complex to canvass within the limitations 
of this paper.18 That these tensions have been intensifying is demonstrated by the fact 
that ‘elite’ has become a dirty word in modern politics—a word which politicians seek 
to apply to their opponents and never to themselves or their political allies. And like 
any such term which becomes part of the weaponry of political slanging matches, it 
has assumed the chameleon-like characteristic of meaning whatever the speaker 
chooses it to mean. 
 
This is not a new phenomenon. In the left’s struggle for power in the early-20th 
century the ‘elite’ was identified in political debate as politicians and bureaucrats who 
were ‘born to rule’ and who viewed power as their hereditary right. In the later part of 
the century, however, the tables were turned when the American right redefined the 
‘elite’ as progressive small ‘L’ liberals, particularly civil rights activists and feminists 
seeking social change, who were depicted as seeking benefit for minority groups at 
the expense of the mainstream.19 In the current Australian debate it is a term that has 
been successfully appropriated by the Howard government through its attack on 
‘political correctness’ and applied with devastating effect to progressive, educated 
small ‘L’ liberals  (in the American sense), who generally lean to the left on social 
issues and tend to vote for Labor or the Greens.20  
 
This attack on ‘elites’ by the Howard government is not without irony considering its 
leader is the second-longest serving Australian Prime Minister after Sir Robert 
Menzies. This, by any reasonable measure, would seem to place him firmly among 
the political elite. Nevertheless, just as elite members of the Athenian Assembly 
strove to maintain the fiction that they were men of the people, in Australia we have a 
Prime Minister identifying himself with the struggle of ‘mainstream’ Australians and 
‘the battlers’ against what his government calls the ‘elite’.  
 
This divisive exploitation of the tension between elites and the demos, however, has 
the opposite effect of the solution devised by the ancient Athenians which was 
designed to reduce tensions within society. The Athenians were in no doubt about 
who constituted the elite and who comprised the demos. In today’s modern 
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representative democracies the definition of what constitutes an ‘elite’ depends on a 
speaker’s political persuasion rather than on any agreed meaning of the word and 
elitist rhetoric is used to exacerbate tensions within society to gain party political 
advantage.  
 
This is not to say that there was no competition between elites in Athenian society, or 
that Athenian demagogues were above painting their opponents as elitists and 
themselves as men of the people in the pursuit of political advantage. The essential 
difference is that Athens was a direct democracy, while modern democracies such as 
Australia are representative. In Athens, elites may have squabbled among themselves, 
but the demos believed that the final decision lay with them. Elites who offended the 
demos ran the risk not only of losing the right to speak but of being banished or even 
executed.21  
 
In modern representative democracies the final decision, in theory, also lies with the 
people via the ballot box but, as demonstrated above, more than half the people, and 
many eminent scholars, do not believe this is the case.  
 
Australians Want More Say 
Nevertheless, even if the majority of Australians think they have little or no say in 
government, what indications are there that they want more? There are three sources 
of evidence we can turn to for answer to this question: support for a directly-elected 
president in the national debate and referendum on whether Australia should become 
a republic; large-scale quantitative national surveys; and support for citizen-initiated 
referendums which allow citizens to determine policy directions on particular issues 
and to make and repeal laws by a direct vote of the people.  
 
Jonathan Kelley and his associates have argued that had the republican model put to 
the people in 1999 included a directly elected president instead of one chosen by the 
Parliament Australia would be a republic. In their view: ‘[T]he public's preference for 
an elected president, for a 'People's choice' republic... is the principal reason the 
referendum failed.’22 Their conclusion is strongly supported by a national poll held 
some time after the referendum. The Newspoll taken in November 2002 showed that 
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it was not only Australian republicans who wanted a president directly elected by the 
people; so did an overwhelming proportion of monarchists if they could not keep the 
Queen. In the poll, 46 percent of respondents favoured a republic with a directly 
elected president, 15 percent a republic with a president appointed by Parliament, 
while 40 percent favoured keeping the Queen and the Governor-General and not 
changing anything. When the choice was reduced to two, however—a directly elected 
president or one appointed by Parliament—79 per cent of respondents favoured a 
directly elected president.23 
 
National polls and surveys have also questioned people directly about the importance 
they attached to having more say in government. In a survey conducted by Roy 
Morgan Research in Australia for the World Values Survey in 1995-6 a plurality (40 
per cent) of respondents nominated ‘Giving people more say in important government 
decisions’ as the most important of role of government. Of the 24 countries surveyed 
in the study, only the Finns were more emphatic than Australians about the need for 
more public participation in decision-making.24  In the 1994 National Science Survey, 
respondents were asked to choose from a list of options and rank them in order of 
priority. They ranked ‘more say for the people’ as Australia’s second highest priority 
just behind ‘maintain order in the nation’. The former attracted 28 percent first 
preference support, the latter 31 per cent, while the other two options—‘fight prices’ 
and ‘freedom of speech’ were given top priority by 14 and 12 percent of the 
respondents respectively.25 In the 1999 AES on the referendum on the republic the 
question was asked in different form: respondents were asked to list the top aims for 
Australia in the next 10 years. Again, ‘giving people more say in important say in 
government decisions’ ranked, behind ‘maintaining order in the nation’, but this time 
the gap was greater—30 per cent saying the former should be the top aim for the 
nation, and 39 per cent the latter.26 This is not surprising in view of unease about the 
nation’s border protection generated in the 1998 general election. The gap widened 
slightly in the 2001 AES following 9/11 and the Bali bombings—with 38 per cent 
favouring making ‘maintaining order’ and ‘26 per cent ‘giving people more say’—as 
the nation’s top priority.27  
 
There is also some evidence from qualitative surveys that wanting more say in 
government is high on the agenda for rural Australians. A 2002 report by an 
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independent think tank, the Eureka Foundation, concluded after a series of forums in 
regional Victoria that the major cry from the bush was not for more money but for 
more participation in the process of government.28 
 
The use of referendums—a traditional way of giving people a direct say in decision-
making in representative democracies—also appears to have majority support among 
Australians. In the 2001 AES, two thirds of the respondents said referendums were a 
'good thing' while less than three percent thought they were a 'bad thing'; the rest 
thought they made no difference.29 Of course Australians' experience with 
referendums is largely concerned with a national referendums on proposals for 
constitutional change and state referendums, particularly on social issues. These are 
much different propositions from citizen-initiated referenda (CIR). Parliaments decide 
the questions to be put, and when they will be put, rather than the people through 
legally binding petitions.  
 
Because Australia does not have CIR, Australians have not been surveyed on their 
attitude to this specific form of referendum on any regular basis, if at all. In polities in 
which it is widely used—states of the USA and in Switzerland, surveys regularly 
show this direct democracy device has the overwhelming support of the people 30 and 
it seems likely that CIR would attract a similar level of support in this country. The 
2003 South Australian Constitutional Convention to discuss parliamentary reform 
deliberated on the introduction of CIR, and overwhelmingly supported this form of 
direct democracy. The convention largely followed the format of a Deliberate Poll and 
the delegates were polled both before and after the convention. Their support for CIR 
remained virtually unchanged—65 per cent before and 64 per cent after. As the 323 
delegates were randomly selected to represent as closely as possible a microcosm of 
the South Australian population the 'before' vote could be equated with a conventional 
opinion poll measuring support for CIR among the population as a whole.31 
 
A Queensland independent, Peter Wellington, also raised the issue of CIR in 
negotiations with Labor Leader, Peter Beattie, which led to the formation of a 
minority Queensland Labor Government in 1998. Although Wellington’s private 
member’s bill to establish CIR in Queensland was ultimately voted down by the major 
parties, it was supported by another Queensland independent and nine One Nation 
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Party members.32 There have also been several unsuccessful attempts to implement 
CIR in the ACT, the most recent being the 1998 Community Referendum Bill which 
provided for a watered-down version of the device.  
 
Leading constitutional expert George Williams, while opposed to CIR, concedes ‘that 
the number of CIR proposals in Australia, particularly over the last decade, 
demonstrates an unrealised desire for increased popular participation in the political 
process.’33 Political scientist John Warhurst also believes that demands for CIR and a 
bill of rights demonstrate that more and more people are dissatisfied with the 
limitations of the present system.34  
 
Giving the People More Say 
The survey data briefly outlined above seems to indicate that support for democracy is 
alive and well in Australia 150 years after Eureka, but is again feeling under some 
constraint. At the start of the new millennium there is pressure to re-release the spirit 
of democracy. This pressure has not gone unnoticed not only by the promoters of 
more direct forms of democracy but also by astute political actors working within the 
conventional representative form of democracy. The elite response, favoured by the 
major political parties, is to encourage public consultation under conditions in which 
they can retain ultimate control while the populist response, favoured some minor 
parties and independents is to give power to the people to decide on public policy 
through CIR. 
 
There are problems, however, with both these approaches and the outcomes, long-
term, may not deliver the benefits the promoters claim in making people feel more 
involved in political decision-making. CIR would allow politically active citizens or 
groups to place issues on the political agenda and the people to have a direct vote on 
them. Nevertheless, a telling argument against using the device in representative 
democracies is that ordinary citizens do not have sufficient information to make 
informed choices on complex issues. Such issues are often the subject of CIR and 
there is no evidence that the majority are prepared to remedy their lack of knowledge 
by sufficiently informing themselves during the referendum campaign. An equally 
compelling argument against the device is that even if they were willing to do so, 
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powerful factional interests would still be able to manipulate public opinion to their 
advantage because of superior access to resources, informational and monetary, 
available to them for the referendum campaign.35 
 
The elite response to a perceived democratic deficit—expanding opportunities for 
public consultation—is also open to elite manipulation.36 In Australia, both the federal 
and state governments have placed increased importance on regular regional cabinet 
meetings to receive feedback from community leaders, local government officials, 
business executives and citizens. Some governments have also experimented with 
citizens' juries, people's panels, and other kinds of consultations. All these 
experiments in ‘participatory democracy’ have one thing in common however: the 
government continues to control the agenda and retains full decision-making power to 
itself.  
 
These initiatives are vulnerable to charges of elite manipulation, whether conscious or 
unconscious, which create legitimacy problems. Fears about manipulation might be 
dissipated if these processes occasionally resulted in policy outcomes that were 
radically different from what the government was perceived to have wanted in the 
first place. But does this ever happen? Recommendations that are compatible with the 
government’s agenda have a good chance making it into legislation while those that 
do not are likely to be shelved.37  
 
It is not only academic critics or political opponents who see the dangers. One of the 
concerns of participants in citizen’s juries is that the exercise might be designed to 
examine their underlying motives and reasons for their views for the purpose of 
political advantage and manipulation rather than as a genuine attempt to sample 
informed public opinion in order to produce policy that truly reflects the interests of 
the majority of citizens.38 If people generally come to see the consultation process as 
‘tokenistic’, ‘shallow’ and ‘cosmetic’ then these initiatives are ultimately likely to 
increase public alienation from government rather than reduce it.39  
 
The Deliberative Poll 
One method of public consultation which certainly must escape the charge of being 
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‘shallow’ is a recent innovation, the Deliberative Poll (DP). American political 
scientist James Fishkin devised the Deliberative Poll as an instrument to sample 
informed public opinion. This is how he describes the concept in his book, The Voice 
of the People: 
The idea is simple. Take a random sample of the electorate [300 to 500] 
and transport those people from all over the country to a single place. 
Immerse the sample in issues, with carefully balanced briefing materials, 
with intensive discussion in small groups, with the chance to ask 
competing experts and politicians. At the end of several days of working 
through the issues face-to-face, poll the participants in detail. The 
resulting survey offers a representation of the considered judgments of the 
public—the views of the country would come to if it had the same 
experience of behaving more like ideal citizens immersed in the issues for 
an extended period.40 
 
More than 50 DPs have been held worldwide, including four in Australia—Australia 
Deliberates on the republic referendum in 1999 and Reconciliation for the 21st 
Century—Where From Here in 2001 on Aboriginal reconciliation, The ACT 
Deliberates: An ACT Bill of Rights and Australia Deliberates: Muslims and Non-
Muslims in Australia. The South Australian Constitutional Convention also used the 
DP format. DPs do seem to offer good prospects of enabling ordinary people to reach 
decisions on policy issues which, by nature of the process, should approximate the 
view of the population as a whole if everyone was well-informed and had deliberated 
at length on the issue. The concept has withstood considerable academic scrutiny and 
criticism and survived reasonably well.41 There appears, however, to be one fatal flaw 
in Fishkin’s project to make the DP a real force for better government; they can have 
no real impact on policy making if neither the ultimate decision makers nor the public 
take much notice of their recommendations and this seems, so far, to be the case with 
DPs.42   
 
The People's Senate 
My proposal to meet the desire for greater public participation in decision-making and 
at the same time overcome most of the objections against CIR is to establish a new 
institution which I have termed the People's Senate. This institution would operate in 
a similar manner to DPs where 300 to 500 citizens, randomly but scientifically 
selected, deliberate on issues referred to them by citizen petition. After hearing the 
evidence for and against they would then vote on proposals on behalf of the entire 
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citizenry. One important difference would be that the decisions of a People's Senate 
like many CIR would be binding on the government.43   
 
A People's Senate, however, has a much greater potential than merely serving as a 
deliberative alternative to CIR. Such an institution could also replace the Federal 
Senate and State Legislative Councils. A People's Senate would allow informed public 
opinion to be consulted on contentious legislation on which the major parties cannot 
agree. The emphasis would be on contentious and divisive legislation. Legislation 
which attracted broad support in the lower house (say two thirds majority support) 
would pass automatically without being referred to a People's Senate. 
 
This would constitute the majority of bills considered by Australian parliaments at the 
present time. Under the current parliamentary system, both at the Commonwealth and 
State levels, the vast majority of bills which receive the support of both major parties 
in the lower house (90 per cent or more) would pass into law by achieving the 
necessary majority in the lower house.44 There is already a mechanism in place in the 
House of Representatives, a Committee of the whole, to deal with non-contentious 
legislation (which constitutes the majority of bills) which has the broad support from 
both major parties. A similar mechanism could be provided in state upper houses if 
one does not exist already. Only contentious bills would need to be put to a People's 
Senate, and even then only those clauses on which the necessary majority in the lower 
house could not agree would need to be deliberated on. Non-controversial clauses 
could be taken as read. 
 
In the case of the minority of contentious legislation, however, which does not have 
bi-partisan support, the government and the opposition would have to argue their case 
before randomly selected representatives of the people. The process could be 
interactive. The government, if it sensed any serious misgivings among 
representatives of the people about its legislation through questions and comments 
from the floor, could amend it to make it more acceptable before the final vote was 
taken. The essential proviso is that any interaction of this nature should be carried out 
in public, and there should be no behind-the-scenes negotiations between the 
government and the people’s representatives. Such a safeguard would avoid any 
possibility of personal inducements being offered to change votes and decrease 
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suspicions of corruption. To offer inducements to members of a People's Senate or try 
to influence them in any way outside of the formal deliberation process would be 
against the law and carry very heavy penalties.  
 
To give legislation acceptable to the people's representatives every chance of passing, 
it would be open to the government and the opposition to engage in closed-door 
negotiations if they wished to try to reach a mutually acceptable position on the 
legislation to put to the assembly before the vote was taken. If the government 
proposals were voted down then the situation would be as it is now when the 
government is unable to get legislation through the Senate. It could be put up in the 
same or an amended form to another People's Senate. 
 
Time Constraints 
As I have mentioned the design of the People's Senate has been modelled on the 
Deliberative Poll but changes have been made where research into group processes 
has indicated a better result would be achieved by amending the format. The People's 
Senate would also need to be more flexible in setting time restrictions for the 
completion of the task at hand. DPs that rely heavily on the goodwill of participants to 
give up their time to participate, have settled on a time schedule which allows for 
minimum disruption to their working lives. This often means that the deliberation 
phase of the process has to be rushed, particularly if, as is often the case, the DP is 
charged with deliberating on a number of complex issues. 
 
Experience has shown that all decision-making bodies—including parliaments—must 
operate under some time restraints if decisions are to be reached in a timely manner. 
Nevertheless, in the case of institutions responsible for making laws of the land, it 
would seem to be essential for adequate time to be allowed for full discussion of the 
issues, while not allowing debate to become endlessly repetitive. The adoption of 
Standing Orders governing the conduct of a People's Senate, including regulating 
debate would prevent the latter evil from occurring.  
 
Nonetheless, I do not think that consideration of all proposed legislation referred to a 
People's Senate could be fitted into a set time period if adequate time for discussion is 
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to be provided. In some cases two-and-a-half days (the time generally allowed for 
DPs) may be sufficient, but with more complex legislation considerably more time for 
learning and deliberation may be needed. For this reason I would propose that no time 
limit be set for a People's Senate, just as no time limits are set for jury trials. I would 
not expect except in exceptional cases, however, that any single People's Senate 
would run much more than a week at the most. 
 
Radical Reform? 
A People's Senate, in some ways, would be a less powerful institution than the present 
upper houses it would replace and its adoption would be a less radical reform than it 
might first appear. It gives ordinary people more say in government by giving a 
representative sample, standing in for the population as a whole, the right to veto 
legislation which, after an intensive process of learning and deliberation, they still 
think is bad policy. They cannot, however, initiate or amend legislation themselves as 
the present upper houses can, or bring down a government by denying supply.45 
 
 The role of a People's Senates in the legislative process would be essentially one of 
either approving or rejecting legislation after considering expert and partisan 
arguments for and against. It would have no direct role in the framing or reframing of 
legislation although, as has been explained, it could influence and change outcomes 
through members being invited to state their objections to the legislation when they 
come to cast their vote. To ask 350 or more lay people to frame actual legislation is, in 
the words of one eminent British constitutional expert, to invite a 'helpless 
exhibition...of helpless ingenuity and wasted mind'.46 Walter Bagehot's comments 
would carry even more weight in the case of a People's Senate. He was critiquing a 
proposal for the scrutiny of bills by a committee of the whole house, and his words 
applied to parliamentarians most, if not all, of whom would have had some experience 
in legislating, not of inexperienced lay persons. 
 
Impartiality: The People's Senate Commission 
If the decisions of a People’s Senate are to be made authoritative it is essential that its 
deliberations not be vulnerable to charges of partiality or manipulation. A People's 
Senate needs not only to be impartial, but to be seen to be impartial. The public (and 
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interest groups) would need to be convinced that none of the processes related to the 
assembly deliberations could be manipulated by the government of the day or anyone 
else. This would necessitate the establishment of a statutory institution, a People's 
Senate Commission to run the People's Senates, which should have a similar degree of 
independence as the Australian Electoral Commission has in administering elections. 
People's Senate Commission staff would be responsible for administrative services to 
the Commission and an Agenda Committee responsible for the day-to-day running of 
a People's Senate. The Agenda Committee, which would have a rotating membership 
and be selected by members of previous People Senate's, would be charged with the 
general oversight of the running of the People's Senate.47 The duties of the committee 
would include, with the assistance of Commission staff, the oversight of the 
organising a People's Senate including appointing the expert panels, preparing the 
briefing papers and providing the trained moderators to assist in the small group 
discussions and organising public meetings and inviting submissions to involve the 
public. During the course of the People's Senate the committee, guided by procedures 
to be set down to ensure the highest possible degree of impartiality, would have final 
responsibility for setting and controlling the agenda.  It would determine the order of 
business in plenary sessions as well as the order of speakers and also oversee the 
selection of questions from small groups to be put to expert panels in plenary sessions 
to avoid repetition while ensuring that all significant points of view be given the 
opportunity to be heard. There may also be a need for a body, similar to the Court of 
Disputed Returns, to hear complaints about improper procedure.  
 
The governing body of the People's Senate—the People's Senate Commission—
should  operate at  a wide arms length from the government as an independent 
statutory authority in a similar fashion to the present Australian Electoral 
Commission48 but should be guaranteed even greater protection from any form of 
influence from the executive. This could be done using a form of sortition to select the 
membership and to replace retiring members. Suitably qualified persons could be 
invited to register their interest, and all those who met the criteria for the position 
would be eligible for selection by lot as positions became available. Former members 
of the Agenda Committee and experienced facilitators are obvious candidates for the 
position of People's Senate Commissioner, but diversity of experience on the 
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governing body would also be important. In light of this, careful consideration would 
have to be given to setting criteria which would allow the selection net to be cast as 
widely as possible. 
 
Wider Public Participation 
The people themselves, in addition to the obvious stakeholders, should have the right 
to have their views considered by a People's Senate. This could be achieved by 
adopting the practice of some government and Senate inquiries of calling for public 
submissions, holding public hearings, and then collating the evidence gathered for 
presentation to the People's Senate as part of the briefing process. The response to 
these ‘pre-hearings’ could also guide the Agenda Committee, with the assistance of 
People's Senate Commission staff, in their selection of panel members for questioning 
by the people’s representatives. The people’s representatives, if they felt their 
questions were not adequately answered could also ask for additional ‘expert’ 
witnesses to be called. 
 
Such pre-hearings providing the public at large, as well as interest groups, the 
opportunity to participate in hearings should go some way to meeting another 
objection to replacing upper houses with a People's Senate: The loss of other services 
to constituents provided by members elected for a set term.  The Senate's public airing 
of controversial public issues and giving ordinary people a chance to have their say at 
public meetings by making submissions is a valuable one. But the public's capacity to 
have real influence of public policy would be enhanced rather than diminished under 
reform I propose. The reports which Senate committees write at the conclusion of the 
extensive (and costly) hearings they conduct are all too often ignored by the 
government and left to gather dust in the archives unless their recommendations 
coincide with government policy. The pre-hearings I propose would go to the People's 
Senate where they would almost undoubtedly influence the deliberations on the issue. 
 
Cost? 
With each People's Senate comprising 350 to 500 delegates the cost obviously would 
be considerable. Whether the cost would be comparable to that of the present upper 
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houses is hard to estimate, depending as it would on a number of factors, including the 
level of payment to people's representatives for their services and the number of 
People's Senate's which would need to be called each year. In trying to arrive at a ball-
park estimate of whether the reforms would result in greater or less expense to the 
taxpayer, it is instructive to consider the cost of supporting the nation's 76 Senators. 
On 1999 figures the cost to taxpayers of each MP in the Federal Parliament has been 
estimated at $A1,500,000 at year making the annual cost for 76 Senators 
$A114,000,000. And this does not include the cost of superannuation payouts.49 The 
cost of the South Australian Constitutional Convention in 2003, which included a 
state-wide program of public meetings, was around $A1,000,000. Obviously, People's 
Senates may well cost more than the SA Constitutional Convention because they 
could run longer, and other factors mentioned above as well as other imponderables 
may also bump up the cost. Nevertheless, $A114,000,000 would pay for a lot of 
People's Senates. 
 
Reducing Political Apathy 
In considering the cost of People's Senates at least two other factors should be taken 
into account: their potential for re-engaging people with the political life of their 
society, producing a more politically aware and educated citizenry, and reducing the 
level of apathy and antipathy to politics, which if not stemmed could pose a threat to 
the legitimacy of government in the future. People's Senates would provide an 
opportunity for large numbers of citizens to take turns to play a direct part in the 
policy-making process, with each group being brought together to consider one major 
piece of legislation and then being replaced by another. The object would be to 
provide the maximum opportunity for as many citizens as possible to serve, limiting 
factors being cost and the actual logistics of bringing large groups together on a 
frequent basis.  
 
If everyone had a reasonable expectation of being asked to serve on an assembly at 
some time during their lives, and of having the opportunity of exerting some genuine 
impact on policy, this should increase the general interest in the political process. The 
proceedings of the assemblies, which would be televised live, should also attract real 
media and community interest because the outcomes of the deliberative process would 
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carry real authority in the policy and law-making process. They would also provide a 
considerable impetus to place greater emphasis in the educational system on training 
in citizenship in the classical sense of the word to prepare citizens to serve on such a 
body. 
 
This is, necessarily given the space limitations of this article, a very brief introduction 
to the concept of People's Senates. The reasons why such an institution is desirable, a 
much more detailed explanation of how it would work, and the benefits it would 
provide to partially overcome the democratic deficit inherent in representative 




This article has posed and attempted to answer the following question: Why is it that 
150 years after the release of the spirit of democracy in Australia, the majority of 
Australians do not think they have much say in the way they are governed. The survey 
data presented points to this indeed being the case, supported by further data 
indicating that the majority of people are not happy with this situation. This 
democratic deficit is—at least in part—the result of a flaw inherent in representative 
democracy which allows ruling elites too much say and ordinary people too little in 
the governance of advanced industrial polities such as Australia. Lastly, the article has 
introduced and briefly explained the workings of a new institution—the People’s 
Senate—which will help overcome this democratic deficit.  
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